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Roles: Criminal Law--Due Process and the Statute of Limitations
CASE COMMENTS

West Virginia is the same as the othodox rule which was expressly
approved in Jackson v. Denno. The West Virginia Supreme Court
has held that, before admitting a confession into evidence, a trial
judge must determine from the evidence that the confession was
voluntarily made. State v. Vance, 146 W. Va. 925, 124 S.E.2d 252
(1962); State v. Brady, 104 W. Va. 523, 140 S.E. 546 (1927).
Menis Elbert Ketchum, H1

Criminal Law-Due Process and the Statute of Limitations
D was arrested seven months after he allegedly sold narcotics
to an undercover policeman. At the trial D was convicted of a
narcotic's violation solely upon the testimony of the undercover
policeman. D denied the sale but was unable to find any other
defense as he remembered nothing at all of what he had done on
the day the sale allegedly occured. The undercover policeman
needed notes to refresh his memory. The court held that D was
denied due process because the long delay between the time the
prosecution's case was completed and the time D was arrested
deprived D of a fair opportunity to defend even though prosecution
commenced before the statute of limitations expired. Ross v. United
States, 349 F.2d 210 (D. C. Cir. 1965).
The court appears to have set a precedent in rejecting the time
set forth in the statute of limitations where constitutional guarantees are involved. The court holds in effect that the maximum
time set forth in the statute for commencing prosecution may be
diminished where there would be a denial of due process if the
statute of limitations were literally applied.
The problems that faced the court in the principal case arise
from a method of police investigation into the so-called "victimless"
crimes. The crimes are generally narcotics offenses, prostitution,
sodomy, liquor sales and gambling. The method often used by
police in detecting these cimes involves an undercover man-either
a plain clothes policeman or a police informer. The undercover man
tries to establish himself in an area where he suspects these crimes
are being committed. Once established and trusted, he hopes that
someone will invite him to commit one of the crimes, or that he
may witness the crimes as they are committed.
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As the agent is effective only while he is trusted by potential
violators, and as becoming trusted is often a difficult and timeconsuming task, it is expedient that he continue gathering evidence
on as many defendants as possible for as long as it is safe for him
to do so. This fact raises the first problem-that of delay. When
a potential defendant is detected early in the period of investigation,
a considerable time may elapse between the assimilation of the
case against him and his arrest. Because of the interest in maintaining the secrecy of the agent's identity, he usually works alone. This
fact raises the second problem-the agent's testimony is generally
uncorroborated.
The chief problem in the principal case was that of delay. The
case laid great emphasis upon the effect the delay had upon the
defendant's memory. The defendant was unable to recall anything
he had done on the day the offense occurred. A witness who had
previously agreed to testify that the defendant had been caring for
her during a sickness on that day declined to do so at the trial
because, as she said, "I didn't think I could remember." On the
other hand, the officer whose testimony was the basis of the prosecution's case had refreshed his memory with a notebook he had
kept during his investigation. He admitted that he could not have
been able to testify without referring to his notes. These facts combined to convince the judges that the purposeful delay of the notice
before bringing charges denied the defendant due process.
The corroboration problem is illustrated by a relatively recent
federal case. In Kelley v. United States, 194 F.2d 150 (D. C. Cir.
1952), the defendant appealed a conviction of unlawfully inviting
another to accompany the accused for lewd and immoral purposes.
The chief evidence of the prosecution was the testimony of a plain
clothes officer whom the defendant was accused of inviting. The
officer had placed himself in a park for the purpose of being so
invited. The conviction was overturned because the testimony of
the policeman was uncorroborated by other evidence indicating the
defendant's guilt. The decision was based upon the likelihood of
false accusation and the difficulty of defense created by the undercover agent method.
The likelihood of false accusation results from two factors inherent in the investigation method. The first is the fact that the officer
is placed on duty in the area to which he is assigned solely to make

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol68/iss2/28

2

Roles: Criminal Law--Due Process and the Statute of Limitations
CASE COMMENTS

arrests for one crime. He too readily may misinterpret an innocent
action or statement. The second factor is that as the agent deals
with a considerable number of defendants over the period of time
he is on a particular assignment, he is more likely to mistake the
identity of the person he accuses than he would be in other situations.
The difficulty of defense also is a result of the nature of the
method of police detection. Faced with the accusing witness, a
falsely accused defendant may have no other defense than his
character and denial of the charges. These two considerations have
caused the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
to require corroboration of an agent's testimony in regard to crimes
such as the one in the Kelley case.
The same dangers appear, although to a lesser extent, in convictions with undercover investigation in other victimless crimes. In
Wilson v. United States, 335 F.2d 982 (D. C. Cir. 1963), Justices
Wright and Bazelon, dissenting from a denial of a hearing of a
conviction similar to the one in the principal case, stated that the
rule of corroboration might well apply to narcotics cases, as the
same method of detection is used. The Justices indicated that an
added factor of difficulty of defense was that "the defendant is
typically an addict who is prejudiced by the 'common' knowledge
that many addicts sell to other addicts in order to support their
habit." Wilson v. United States, supra at 984-5. It follows from this
argument that convictions of other victimless crimes where the sole
prosecution evidence is the testimony of an undercover agent may
be overturned for lack of corroboration.
Justice Danalar dissented from the decision in the principal case.
His reasoning (other than the majority had erroneously weighed
the evidence) was based upon two propositions. The first was that
the decision was contrary to clear law laid down in a previous
federal case that ". . . [a] delay which occurs between the commis-

sion of an offense and the commencement of prosecution is controlled exclusively by the applicable statute of limitations . ..."

The second was that the decision results in an unwarranted court
supervision of police methods of investigation.
Whereas this appears to be the first time an American court has
overturned a conviction for excessive delay between detection of
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the crime and beginning of the prosecution, this holding has been
foreshadowed in prior cases. In Nickens v. United States, 323 F.2d
808 (D. C. Cir. 1963), the court considered the question of such
a delay. In a footnote to a sentence which stated that the claim of
excessive delay related to the applicable statute of limitations was
a statement that "[T]his is not to suggest that delay between offense
and prosecution would not be so oppressive as to constitute a denial
of due process." The holding in the principal case seems to be the
result of the ". . . growing apprehension . . ." at the ". . . recurring
spectacle of [narcotics] convictions . . ." similar to the one in the

principal case. The majority judges admit that as to narcotics cases
at least, the statute of limitations is no longer the sole test as to
when the prosecution must be initiated.
The dissenting argument in the principal case puts forward the
public interest in the effective and efficient enforcement of the
criminal law. The undercover agent method seems the best method
of detecting the victimless cimes. The nature of the crimes is such
that they are committed in private in the absence of any potential
complaining witness. Thus, without the presence of undercover
agents, there is detection only when the offense is committed
flagrantly or in the presence of a witness.
The results obtained by the undercover agent in the principal
case illustrate the efficient effectiveness of this sort of investigation.
Offenses by fifty-one different people were detected. Thirty-four
were indicted; one was a "dealer" or distributor of narcotics. The
requirement that an undercover man be revealed by arrests at an
early stage in his investigation might cripple the method. The agent
would be stopped at a time when he is best able to detect crimes,
and perhaps before he had gained enough trust to obtain evidence
on "higher-ups."
It is difficult to predict what effect this case will have on police
investigation into victimless crimes. Although the decision was limited to narcotics cases, its reasoning applies equally well to other
victimless crimes. If it is applied, how soon after the completion
of the government case must prosecution begin? Will the courts
now extend the holding of this case by reducing the time allotted
in a statute of limitations in any case where constitutional guarantees are denied? The failure to answer these and other questions
makes any attempt to foresee the effect of the holding speculative.
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With the increasing judicial review of police detection methods
evidenced by the search and seizure and confession cases, these
problems of the undercover method of police detection probably
will receive more attention. Courts again will have to balance the
interest in effective law enforcement and the interest in a fair opportunity for defense for the accused. The courts now seem less likely
to allow what Justice Roberts termed "the reprehensible methods"
used by the undercover agents. Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S.
435, 453 (1932).
ForrestHansburyRoles
Damages-The Per Diem Method of Arguing Pain and Suffering
Ps brought an action to recover damages for injuries received in
an automobile accident caused by D's negligence. The district court
allowed Ps"counsel to use the per diem basis in his argument to recover damages for pain and suffering. In addition, charts were used
to demonstrate the per diem computations. The judgment for Ps
was reversed on the ground that argument designed to mislead jury
into believing that proper award for pain and suffering was a matter
of precise determination constituted reversible error. Johnson v.
Colglazier, 348 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1965).
The basic approach of the per diem method is to break down pain
and suffering into units of time. The total units are calculated from
P's expected life span, as computed from an annuity table. In instances where P is not expected to incur pain and suffering for the
remainder of his lifetime, computations are based upon the expected
duration of discomfort.
The majority in the principal case based its opinion on Botta v.
B runner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958). The New Jersey court
held that in using such argument P's counsel was basing figures
upon mere speculation without supporting evidence. Also, New
Jersey courts forbid reference by counsel to the ad damnum clause
in the complaint.
West Virginia's Supreme Court of Appeals in Crum v. Ward,
146 W.Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961), followed the New Jersey
court by holding that counsers use of the per diem argument constituted reversible error. See 65 W. VA. L. REv. 237, 238 (1962).
The controversy concerning use of the per diem method is generally
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